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Thesis statement: 
In order for humanity to maintain long term sustainable behavior while preserving core values
(freedom, social fulfillment, artistic expression), the predominant form of human society (the
prevailing human culture) must abandon the prevailing ideology characterized by a human
prejudice which grants moral privilege to humans solely in virtue of their humanity. A new
moral sensibility needs to be adopted that encourages a biocentric perception of the living
members of our ecological communities as equal ends-in-themselves.
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Introduction
The purpose of this thesis is to argue that the internalization of a biocentric moral code
and the abandonment  of  the human prejudice is  both philosophically desirable  as  well  as
socially  and  ecologically  beneficial.  The  following  will  describe  the  ecological  crisis,  its
human cause, and explain the philosophical inadequacies of our current anthropocentric moral
sensibilities as well as addressing the ethical and political consequences of changing our moral
paradigm  to  be  biocentric  oriented.  The  goal  is  to  find  a  way  to  alter  our  behavior  to
complement  our  ecosystems  instead  of  harming  and  degrading  them  without  sacrificing
essential values that make our lives meaningful. I hope this thesis presents a fresh take on
biocentrism that applies existentialist ideas to the field of environmental ethics and present a
practical moral sensibility that is  both rational and beneficial.  Ultimately we will  find our
human prejudice to be grounded in an irrational nepotism in our own favor that has created the
circumstances that threaten the future of both ourselves and many of our ecological neighbors.
4
Jeffrey Gardner
The Human Prejudice and the Problem of Sustainability
Chapter 1: Sustainability and the Prevailing Human Culture
This  chapter  will  define  the  nature  of  the  environmental  crisis  and  show,  using
empirical evidence, it is caused by the behavior of the prevailing human culture; ultimately we
will see the root of this problem lies in our culture’s current ethical sensibility of ‘humans’ in
relation to nonhuman elements of the environment. 
The scientific evidence at our disposal overwhelmingly suggests there exists a serious
ecological problem: a crisis caused by the dominant human society's unsustainable behavior.
For this thesis I will approach ‘Sustainability’ as that which refers to a community's ability to
be supported long term by its ecosystem. This, I believe, even within a strictly human context,
requires the preservation of a variety of keystone species (species that serve critical roles in the
functioning  of  an  ecosystem)  such  as  bees  which  we  depend  on  for  crop  pollination  or
phytoplankton  which  produces  the  majority  of  Earth’s  oxygen.  The  US  Environmental
Protection Agency provides an adequate definition of sustainability for this thesis: “To pursue
sustainability is to create and maintain the conditions under which humans and nature can
exist in productive harmony to support present and future generations” (epa.gov 2016). In this
first chapter, I am concerned only with measuring the costs pertaining to the preservation of
the present and future generations of humans which serves to show the ecological threat to
present day society. This first chapter serves to show that there is a human caused ecological
crisis that possess a threat to the continued thriving of the both natural ecosystems and the
human species,  moreover current efforts  in “environmentalism” is  inadequate to solve this
crisis. My argument in chapter 1 frames the ecological crisis in terms of humans but this does
not presuppose anthropocentrism. It only presupposes that things are bad enough if they are
bad for humans (it  does not commit  to saying that they are bad  only if   they are bad for
humans).
An ecosystem is defined as a community of living organisms interacting with essential
nonliving elements of their environment (e.g rivers, the nitrogen cycle, soil,  etc.); in other
words,  “the  complex  of  living  organisms,  their  physical  environment,  and  all  their
interrelationships in a particular unit of space” (Encyclopædia Britannica 2015). In the current
crisis, our problem lies not in an isolated ecosystem but in the biosphere as a whole – defined
as  the  unity  of  all  ecosystems  that  exist  on  Earth.  Some  scientists  categorize  the  whole
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biosphere as a single ecosystem (some, such as James Lovelock, may claim the biosphere is a
single organism in itself),  but for the sake of this  project  the biosphere need only be the
interconnected collective of all Earth's ecosystems. Our ‘biological community’ is composed
of the living members that  play a part  in the ecosystems we depend on and refers to  the
network of life that interdependently makes up the living systems of Earth that we as a species
are a part of.
Most scientists  within the relevant fields (e.g.  biology, conservation,  ecology) have
almost  unanimously recognized  the  fact  that  the  current  trend  of  human  behavior,  if  left
unrestrained, will eventually result in some sort of collapse of Earth's ecosystems. This is to
say the habitat of Earth will eventually no longer be able to support humans and many other
species due to the behavior of the prevailing human culture. In fact, if humans do not begin to
voluntarily change their behavior immediately and drastically, degradation in the environment
will force them to, resulting in a violent transition marked by widespread suffering and death
(this, I suppose, is worst case scenario - for humans anyway). We seem to be quickly moving
towards  a  fate  foretold  by  Murray  Bookchin  in,  “Toward  an  Ecological  Society”,  “the
biosphere will become so fragile that it will eventually collapse from the standpoint of human
survival needs and remove the organic preconditions for human life” (Bookchin 1980: 83). 
For the purpose of this thesis, I define the prevailing human culture as the widespread
form of human society marked by two key characteristics: The first being the fact that the
prevailing culture, without restriction, takes resources from the ecosystem – whether through
the excessive use of fossil fuels or through the depletion of soil nutrients for food production:
the prevailing culture takes a lot and provides little to the ecosystem. The second and most
important  characteristic  for  this  thesis  is  the  fact  that  this  culture  is  characterized  by  an
anthropocentric ideology that humans possess a special value with increased privileges based
solely on their membership to humanity – described here on out as the human prejudice.
There are other unique characteristics of the prevailing human culture that are not a
direct concern of this thesis, however, one additional characteristic is the great extent to which
the  prevailing  human  culture  transforms  its  habitat:  we  transform  the  habitat  to  create
productive land, change the course of rivers, dig up mountains in search of valuable minerals,
and  modify  animals  to  create  new  breeds  for  domestication.  Obviously  much  of  this
transformation is at odds with sustainability and treating the life within an ecosystem as an
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end-in-itself, however, I do not intend to argue that this transformation is inherently wrong,
my intent  (as  this  thesis  develops)  instead  is  to  challenge  us  to  figure  out  how  we  can
transform the habitat to our favor without doing excessive harm to the ecosystem and reducing
the variety of nonhuman life strictly to a tool for our own gain.
1.1 – Unsustainability and the Environmental Crisis
Since  the  prevailing  human  culture  has  spread  across  all  of  Earth,  the  object  of
environmental concern has become the entire planet, and although humans could theoretically
expand beyond Earth into outer space the same problem would eventually arise; if humans had
a larger planet or multiple planets to expand to, the current behavior of the prevailing human
culture still could not be sustained as a matter of fact. Since this thesis is concerned with the
biosphere of Earth, some may ask why concern is not directed at all life (e.g. at aliens). The
day may come when doing so is appropriate, but we are concerned with the biosphere because
of our relationship with it and the lifeforms that it is composed of; a theoretical alien race at
this point in our history has no relevant relation to us, so at the moment the biosphere is the
only realm where ethical questions should be asked. 
There exists  a cultural  trend of exponential  growth and expansion characterized by
what Bookchin calls a ‘grow or die’ fact of life (Bookchin 1980). Today we may associate the
characteristic of exponential growth with industrialization, however, industrialization merely
accelerated an already occurring phenomenon of the prevailing human culture that had been
present for centuries before hand (e.g. Ancient Greece). From the point of view of what’s best
for the biosphere, this dominant human culture is not working as it should. The task at hand
can be referred to as “saving the world” both from humans and for humans. It may very well
be true that with man gone there will be increased hope for the survival of gorillas – this
entails that the elimination of humans from Earth could save the rest of the natural world, but
in this thesis I will only assume that we want to save the world of gorillas and people.
Here I  will  illustrate  the thesis  of this  chapter  with respect  to  one phenomenon in
particular:  loss  of  biodiversity.  It  is  safe  to  say that  at  this  point  loss  of  biodiversity and
destruction of ecosystems is beginning to reach critical levels.  Biodiversity is defined as the
variation of life within an ecosystem (Faith 2016). According to many reputable biologists, we
are now fast approaching a ‘mass extinction event’ that has only happened five times in the
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known history of Earth. These events are marked by the overwhelming widespread loss of
biodiversity through the extinction of species. Furthermore, this particular mass extinction is
argued to be triggered directly by the actions of humans. Claims of “mass extinction” might
sound dramatic, associated with predictions of apocalyptic hellfire from volcanoes or meteors.
However,  mass  extinction  doesn’t  have  to  be  so  theatrical,  when  scientists  say  “mass
extinction” they are merely stating that current extinction rates are many times higher than
average historical or natural extinction rates – and considering the massive loss of natural
habitat over the last 500 years this should not come as too much of a surprise; humans after all
have transformed massive portions of the Earth into artificial ecosystems and urban population
centers at the cost of nonhuman life every step of the way. A study conducted by biologists
from  universities  including  Stanford,  Princeton,  and  Berkeley  used  “conservative
measurements” to compare the extinction rates of species  today,  to  the extinction rates  of
species during the past mass extinction events and to a control group (the normal extinction
rates of species). If the theory is correct we have now, “without any significant doubt”, entered
the beginning stages of a 6th great mass extinction:
This [loss of biodiversity] affects human well-being by interfering with crucial ecosystem services such as
crop pollination and water purification and by destroying humanity’s beautiful, fascinating, and culturally
important living companions (4, 5, 15, 27–30). [...] Our analysis shows that current extinction rates vastly
exceed natural average background rates, even when (i) the background rate is considered to be double
previous  estimates  and  when  (ii)  data  on  modern  vertebrate  extinctions  are  treated  in  the  most
conservative plausible way (brackets added) (Ceballos, et al. 2015: 3).
Other research measuring the global loss of biodiversity has been done by R. Dirzo, who
claims:
The evidence that  we have just reviewed indicates that  a massive extinction event,  driven by human
beings, has been underway for some 40,000 years. In recent times, when we have more exact estimates of
extinction, the situation has become far more drastic, as reviewed recently by the World Conservation
Union (IUCN) (Dirzo, et al 2003: 154). 
Whether one wishes to call the current loss of species a “mass extinction event” or not is
inconsequential,  the  central  claim is  the  biosphere  is  currently  losing  an  incredibly  large
numbers  of  species  and it  is  reasonable  to  claim that  this  loss  will  eventually result  in  a
negative impact to humans.
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Loss of biodiversity and the extinction of species is not in itself inherently bad (species
naturally go extinct all the time) nor do I wish my argument in this thesis to imply or rely on
any cosmological or intrinsic significance of “life”. However, as stated above, many species
that are going extinct play a significant role in the cycles of life on Earth. One example is the
regional loss of pollinators (such as bees and butterflies), as many plants are dependent on
them to reproduce and animals, including humans, are dependent on these plants for food. As
of early 2017, The U.S. Fish and Wildlife  Service added the once common rusty patched
bumblebee  (one  of  Eastern  North  America's  most  productive  native  pollinators)  to  the
endangered species list (FWS 2017). The reasons for the decline of pollinators is generally
attributed to a cocktail of pesticides used for human agriculture (Chagnon et al, 22: 2008).
Another system that is in danger are the Earth’s marine food webs due to overfishing on a
global scale. Research done by marine biologist, Daniel Pauly, claims that:
Fishing down food webs (that is, at lower trophic levels) leads at first to increasing catches, then to a
phase  transition  associated  with  stagnating  or  declining  catches.  These  results  indicate  that  present
exploitation patterns are unsustainable (Pauly, et al. 1998: 860).
This is problematic because humans across the globe are deeply dependent on various marine
food webs for their very livelihood, and the collapse of these ecosystems could be catastrophic
not just for the prevailing human culture but all humans that depend on marine resources.
Today the issue of global  climate change has taken the forefront  of environmental
concern, with the vast majority of research supporting the claim that global climate change is
real, human caused, and is the source of many detrimental environmental issues including
rising ocean levels, spread of invasive species, and extinction of keystone species. 
“The opinions of scientists with greater expertise converge, and they expect larger temperature increases,
higher  percentages  of  species  extinctions,  and  a  high  percentage  of  species’ ranges  will  change  in
response to climate change over the next 100 years” (Javeline 2013: 666). 
The human cause of climate change is mostly associated with the emission of greenhouse
gases through the burning of fossil fuels. “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
leaves  little  doubt  that  global  warming is  occurring  and is  caused primarily  from carbon
dioxide emissions from human fossil fuels” (Holechek 2007: 35). 
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It is important to point out that while climate change is on the forefront of today’s
environmental mind, in reality it is but one issue in a sea of potential ecological catastrophes,
and the issue at hand is not avoided by climate change deniers. In no way is my argument
dependent on the existence of “global warming”; sustainability issues extend far beyond it and
have  existed  well  before  we  had  any  knowledge  of  human  caused  climate  change.  The
environmental problems I have described above are but a small sample of the environmental
issues we face today and there are numerous human caused ecological problems that I do not
have the space to describe.
1.2 – Human Culture and Exponential Population Growth
The question now arises:  how exactly are  these environmental  problems related to
what I call the human prejudice? Well, most environmental problems can be, in one way or
another, reduced to one underlying issue: overpopulation. Humans have been able to maintain
population  at  an  unprecedented  high  level,  one  that  is  unsustainable  in  the  long  term –
evidence of which can be found in the massive loss of natural habitat that has been destroyed
to meet the demand for human shelter and food consumption. It can be argued that humanity
has been well beyond its “carrying capacity” for some time now, meaning human population is
beyond the point in which the resources of the biosphere can support us indefinitely – that is,
unless human population starts to dramatically lower itself we will be facing ecosystems in the
future with scarce resources plagued by starvation and accompanied by war waged over access
to food and water. It should be stated, though, that the nature of modern society makes human
carrying capacity nearly impossible to pinpoint exactly.
 
Although  deteriorating  environmental  conditions  may  be  symptoms  of  the  human  population  reaching
carrying capacity, we do not know what the carrying capacity of humans would be if changes occurred in our
behavior and technology (Gehrt 1991: 901).
Regardless of how far we can theoretically extend our potential carrying capacity,  the fact
remains  that  human population is  dangerously high  and even considering  possible  human
innovation and advancements it should be agreed that human population is dangerously close
to depleting Earth of its vital human-survival resources which entails that as resources become
more scarce, a period of dramatic and violent reduction in human population is on the horizon.
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The problem of overpopulation has a cause as well – all species grow in population in
regards  to  the  food and resources  at  their  disposal.  Exponential  population  growth is  not
unique to humans, but generally the natural limits of resource gathering and the nature of
competition between species prevents it from occurring on such a scale. Additionally, most
species  lack  the  cognitive  ability  necessary  to  find  innovative  means  of  increasing  their
carrying capacity. In humans, our cognition and cooperation allows us to deplete resources
beyond a normal species, and the ideologies we have adopted have encouraged overpopulation
to continue and accelerate.
This overpopulation phenomenon is the result of how the  prevailing human culture
interacts  with  its  food  and  its  competitors  for  food.  The  cognitive  capacity  of  humans
combined  with  certain  behaviors  and  attitudes  allowed  overpopulation  to  occur  on  this
massive scale; we have adopted a mindset that encourages the production of more than we
need and this  in turn encourages population growth. A community simply cannot grow in
population  and  outcompete  its  neighbors  without  having  a  serious  advantage  in  terms  of
resources at their disposal; when one community of humans began to not only outcompete but
started to overwhelm, annihilate, and subjugate surrounding human communities they had to
have had an advantage that allowed them to disrupt the natural order of competition.  The
theory is that the dominating communities had abundant resources at their disposal that they
could use on war and population growth while other communities of humans were not storing
up massive amounts of resources that could be funneled into a war effort. This allowed the
dominating human communities to do what no animal ever had the means to do in the past:
annihilate their competition. 
This behavior is a result of certain ideologies and mentalities that the prevailing human
culture has developed: A mindset to treat the life that contributes to the production of our food
as nothing but a commodity (a means to an end) and also to treat nonhuman competitors for
our food as something to be subjugated or annihilated. This then lead to the prevailing human
culture  to  develop  the  tendency to  annihilate,  subjugate,  and integrate  competing  human
cultures who are not “making good enough use of the land”– this is to say that the prevailing
human culture encourages the conquering of outside communities and their integration into the
lifestyle  of this  dominant culture.  The mentality of the  prevailing human culture does not
merely  dominate  nature,  it  does  so  to  humans  as  well;  Bookchin  describes  the  effect
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“hierarchical mentality” has on the human dominion over nature (Bookchin 1980) – to me this
involves a higher class which controls the resources and forces the lower class to work and
expand in order for them to gain access to an adequate portion of those resources.
A good illustration of the ideology to expand and dominate can be seen in the concept
of Manifest Destiny used in the early United States to encourage American society to develop
westward; used in the early 1800’s by President James Polk and characterized by a religious
drive  to  conquer  and  develop  the  west  of  North  America  that  was  inhabited  by  Native
Americans, much to the distaste to the early American naturalist Henry David Thoreau who
wrote “Civil Disobedience” in direct response to Polk’s presidency. According to scholar in
Native American studies, Robert Miller:
Historians have for the most part agreed that there are three basic themes to Manifest Destiny. 1. The
special virtues of the American people and their institutions; 2. America’s mission to redeem and remake
the world in the image of America; and, 3. A divine destiny under God’s direction to accomplish this
wonderful task. It was pretty easy and comfortable for Americans to accept that their virtue, mission, and
divine  ordination  mandated  the  expansion  of  America’s  borders  because  that  thinking  helped  salve
American consciences about empire building and the possibility that the Oregon country and the lands
taken in the 1846 Mexican-American war were nothing more than American “colonies” (Miller 2006:
120).
Here the domination of nature and native lands and the transformation of the “wilderness” of
the  west  was  not  merely  encouraged,  it  was  essentially  demanded  both  by  “American
exceptionalism” and the Christian God.
However, this characteristic of storing resources, increasing population, and expanding
outward remained inconsequential on the global scale up to a point in human history. While
preindustrial societies like Ancient Greece exhibited these unsustainable characteristics, the
society was simply limited in the extent to which it could expand – limits that are no longer in
place  due  to  industrialization  and  the  technological  advancements  of  the  modern  age
accelerated even more by the growth demanded by modern capitalism. Even if we were to
dramatically  reduce  human  population,  without  also  changing  our  ethical  sensibilities  we
would hardly be solving the problem of sustainability. While overpopulation remains a key
factor  in  unsustainability  it  is  also  true  that  majority  of  the  blame  of  much  of  today’s
ecological harm can be placed on the behavior of a small minority of humans living today, and
while the demand for resources by our massive population is  a great contributor we must
recognize that regardless of population size we must curb our behavior. In other words a large
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portion  of  humans  could  disappear  from Earth  and  it  would  be  hardly beneficial  for  the
biosphere if the rest of us continue with the same destructive production-based behavior. “We
must  change people's  behavior  whether  or  not  we stem the  tide  of  population  growth.  If
behavior and technology can wreak such havoc, why can they not be a source of salvation?”
(Gehrt 1996, 902). While in many regards our technology is a driving force for our current
ecological problems, this is only so because we advance our technology with the mindset and
ideology of the prevailing human culture.  Technology in itself is not to be blamed, it is the
mindset in which we use and create it that poses the problem. The anthropocentric prejudice of
the prevailing  human culture allowed and encouraged population  growth  which  was  then
accelerated  by technology – this  means our  use  of  technology is  a  major  contributor  and
accelerator of the environmental problem but the source remains in an ideology that has been
adopted by the prevailing human culture.
1.3 – The Problem of  Human-Centered Ecology and Materialistic Culture
I will now reject opponents who do not believe an ideological change of any sort is
necessary, useful, or desirable in relation to the environment. These opponents do not merely
defend anthropocentrism but wish to cling to something along the lines of a biblical concept of
human dominion over land, and claim that any sort of environmental change should be done
through single issue reforms and policy changes or through a cost-benefit analysis based on
human interests. Mark Sagoff provides us with examples of arguments from this camp; he
describes an economic view on the environment that would create policy in response to an
economic cost-benefit analysis of environmental protection:
When this [when environmental policy is designed through an economic cost-benefit analysis] is done,
they [some economists] argue, pollution will be controlled, endangered species will be saved, and pristine
areas will be preserved, but only to the extent that the benefits therefrom exceed the costs. Any increase in
environmental protection from an “optimal” level “would cost more than it is worth.” While any decrease
would “reduce benefits more than it would save cost” (brackets added) (Sagoff 1981: 1393-1394).
However, Sagoff replies that such a view ignores the fact that our society’s motivations in
protecting the environment are not merely reduced to ‘economic benefits’,  they also come
from the desire for other benefits such as cleaner air and water which cannot be reduced to
economic profit. Setting aside economic interests, a cost-benefit analysis can also be focused
on  broader  human  interests.  To  this,  conservation  biologist,  Stanley  Gehrt,  argues  that
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approaching conservation from a human cost-benefit analysis will fail to initiate the desired
change:
Because North American culture is largely materialistic and anthropocentric, attempts to demonstrate the
value of biodiversity have centered on direct or indirect benefits to humans (Wilson 1988; Primack 1993).
However necessary these cost-benefit efforts are, there are limitations to their effectiveness, and they may
not always produce the desired results (Ehrenfeld 1988; Primack 1993). The true value of biodiversity is
inevitably minimized when a cost-benefit rationale is used (Gehrt 1996: 902).
I would add that it is dangerous to attempt to calculate the costs of tampering with natural
ecosystems as we are rarely fully aware of the impact our actions have at the moment we
exploit an element of nature. Humans a lot of the time do not realize the negative effects of
their environmental meddling until after a problem has already emerged; we did not know of
the threat of global warming until long after the effects of climate change were well in motion
due to our use of fossil fuels, nor did we foresee the Great American Dust Bowl of the 1930’s
which was caused by erosion from decades of poor farming practices and left the land barren
for decades.1 Our ignorance is illustrated by Aldo Leopold and his experience of the hunting of
predators in North America and the results of unregulated hunting practices which he partook
in:
In those days we had never heard of passing up a chance to kill a wolf. […] We reached the old wolf in
time to watch a fierce green fire dying in her eyes. I realized then, and have known ever since, that there
was something new to me in those eyes- something known only to her and to the mountain. I was young
then, and full of trigger-itch; I thought that because fewer wolves meant more deer, that no wolves would
mean hunters’ paradise. But after seeing the green fire die, I sensed that neither the wolf nor the mountain
agreed with such a view (brackets added) (Leopold 1949: 129-130).
Leopold goes on to explain that without wolves, the deer population exploded and trimmed the
mountain bare of vegetation which eventually resulted in the starvation of the deer and the
erosion of the mountain. This serves as a metaphor for the Earth as a whole and how every
part of it plays a role in its continued balance whether they realize it or not.  When we act with
only a concern for human costs and benefits we inadvertently cause harm to not just other
lifeforms but to ourselves eventually as well. When it comes to rational environmental action
1The American Dust Bowl was an event the occurred in the midwest farmlands of the US in the 1930’s and was 
marked by a horrible drought accompanied by brutal dust storms (“black blizzards”) which dislocated mass 
numbers of farmers and their families. It is described by some as the worst man-made disaster of the 20th 
century. Long term use of poor farm techniques (e.g. deep-soil plowing) essentially turned the soil into dust 
making it not only unfarmable but essentially created hundreds of miles of barren wasteland which was 
eloquently captured by John Steinbeck’s novel, Grapes of Wrath.
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of  humans  we  cannot  merely  measure  the  costs  in  terms  of  the  known  costs  –  the
interconnected effect that different life-forms within an ecosystem have on one another is far
too high.
A main  argument  from Sagoff  [written  in  support  of  arguments  made by Michael
Krieger  (1973)  in  “What’s  Wrong  with  Plastic  Trees”]  focuses  only  on  the  benefits  of
environmentalism from the human point of view. Sagoff argues in “On Preserving the Natural
Environment”, the total replacement of natural environments with artificial ones is entirely
acceptable and even preferable. Sagoff claims: “Nature is a war of each against all, as Hobbes
said,  and man and beast  alike prefer  the safety and comfort  of an artificial  environment”
(Sagoff 1974: 222). Sagoff goes on to claim that,  “except for the limit of our technology,
however, there is no economic or even utilitarian rationale available for preserving the natural
environment”  (Sagoff  1974:  225).  Sagoff  seems  to  believe  the  solution  to  our  ecological
problems can be found in the advancement of our technology, and living in an almost entirely
artificially designed and maintained world is both possible and desirable. 
I would counter, however, that he has vastly overestimated the ability of technology.
Nonetheless, many adhere to the view that this is the form that human progress has taken and
will  continue  to  do  so  as  we  “progress”  into  the  future  –  “Man  has  chosen  to  live  in
manufactured habitats ever since he came down from the trees; there is no reason to think his
trend away from nature will  change today” (Sagoff 1974: 221). However,  I would dispute
firstly that not all humans have migrated away from nature and second, mankind’s happiness
and fulfillment has not necessarily increased as we perpetually put up stronger boundaries
between  ourselves  and  nature.  Our  concrete  sanctuaries  and  artificial  society  may  have
increased our lifespans but many claim that members of ‘civilized’ modern society are more
likely to suffer from anxiety and depression as well as having a decreased sense of purpose. In
support of this claim I look at research conducted by anthropologist, Edward Schieffelin, who
interviewed over 2,000 Aboriginal Kaluli people of Papua New Guinea and only found one
subject who presented marginal symptoms of clinical depression, and this is despite the high
rate of infant mortality, parasitic infection, and violent death that the Kaluli people suffer from
(Schieffelin 1985). Depression within Kaluli society, he says, is “a disorder that seems to be
rare and is not culturally recognized” (Schieffelin 1985: 107).2 
2“Kaluli society is egalitarian. There are no big men or traditional positions of authority among the various 
longhouse communities. Each individual is customarily expected to take his own initiative in making his way in 
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In addition, there is reason to doubt the ability of technological advancement to one
day artificially replace all aspects of organic nature that we are dependent on for survival –
technology in itself is not energy nor is it food, it is merely a tool we use to survive and to
thrive. To this, Taylor asserts that, “To think we have complete control over the environment,
or that we will have such control someday, is a sign of arrogance and an illusion of grandeur.
The results of that self-deception are all too evident in the world around us” (Taylor 1986:
104). Furthermore, it is generally accepted that artificial environments are incredibly fragile
due to their simplicity, explained here by Bookchin: 
Ecologists have already pointed out that the more simplified an ecosystem – as in arctic and desert biomes
or in monocultural forms of food cultivation – the more fragile the ecosystem and more prone it is to
instability, pest infestations, and possible catastrophes (Bookchin 1980: 75).
Bookchin goes on to claim that, “The system in its devouring of nature will reduce the entire
biosphere to the fragile simplicity of desert and arctic biomes” (Bookchin 1980: 83). Generally
our artificial  ecosystems are very simplistic,  such as in monoculture food cultivation.  Our
widespread use of GMO crops makes these ecosystems even more fragile due to the reduction
of the genetic diversity of crops which makes them more susceptible to diseases (consider the
Irish potato famine of 1845 that occurred largely due to the Irish’s dependence on a single
species of potato that was targeted by a blight). Theoretically we could create more complex
ecosystems but that is certainly not a reflection of our current artificial environments. As of
now, the creation of a society completely dependent on artificial environments seems to risk
placing us in a fragile situation plagued by the potential for catastrophe. 
My final  objection to  this  appeal  to  entirely artificial  societies  as  is  argued for by
Krieger and Sagoff is that it may put humans in a situation to be easily oppressed and put at
the mercy of huge corporations or whoever it is that maintains the artificial world (this trend, I
think, has already started to occur). This is to say that human survival would be completely
dependent on the people controlling and maintaining the artificial community. For example, if
we replace natural pollinators with tiny drones, then whoever controls the drones controls
whose crops  get  pollinated.  It  seems living  in  an  entirely or  mostly artificial  world  risks
putting all  of  us at  the mercy of the people that  control  the technology and the threat  of
collapsing into a dystopia seems to be a very real possibility.
Kaluli society and gaining support of others” (Schieffelin 1985: 108).
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The underlying problem with the views of Sagoff and Krieger is that the concept of
human dominion over the land and its inhabitants remains unquestioned, and while we can try
to alter our behavior so as to have a less severe effect on the land this will hardly solve our
ecological problems. Bookchin in, “Toward An Ecological Society”, describes the Nixon style
“environmentalist” that merely wants the knowledge on how to take from the nature without
repercussions for the economic structure of society:
Mr. Nixon, I would suppose, is an “environmentalist” of sorts insofar as the “peace” he would establish
with nature consists of the “know-how” for plundering the natural world with minimal disruption of the
habitat. “Environmentalism” does not bring into question the underlying notion of the present society that
man must dominate nature (Bookchin 1980: 74-75). 
Bookchin argues for the necessity of radical ecological change in society, one that requires
both  behavioral  changes  and  dramatic  ideological  changes  in  not  just  how we view “the
wholeness of nature” but also in the current hierarchical mentality of human society. “Either
we will create an ecotopia based on ecological principles, or we will simply go under as a
species. In my view this is not apocalyptic ranting– it is a scientific judgment that is validated
daily by the very law of life of the prevailing society” (Bookchin 1980: 85). This “law of life”
pertains to the ‘grow or die’ economic structure brought to its full fruition by capitalism. 
Notice that we have not yet come to question anthropocentrism or the increased moral
value  of  humans;  in  this  chapter,  I  am merely  stating  that  moral  conceptions  around  the
environment  need  to  change,  in  some  way,  and  mere  policy  changes  or  technological
advancement in the structure of society ignore the true issue at hand. Limited space prevents
me  from  covering  and  criticising  all  possible  alternatives  to  my  proposal.  Even  radical
economic change, such as replacing capitalism with socialist policy is insufficient – as human
dominion over land would still be morally justifiable entailing the possible persistence of our
ecologically harmful behavior – economic change must be accompanied by a change in moral
sensibility. Chapter  II  will  begin  the  discussion  on  the  nature  and  the  severity  of  the
ideological change that is needed within this prevailing human culture.
As I transition into Chapter II,  the facts  attained through scientific research should
make it clear that from an objective ecological point of view there is a problem with how the
prevailing human culture is behaving; this is to say that as far as the ecological systems of
Earth  are  considered  there  is  something  wrong  with  us:  something  wrong  with  certain
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characteristics of the prevailing human culture, something that is not working in the ecological
sense. This, human “us”, is a concept under serious debate within this thesis. This collective
“us”  or  “we” refers  to  this  concept  of  humanity as  something  united  under  what,  in  my
terminology, is called the “human tribe”. The human tribe has three defining characteristics,
(1) they more or less engage in the same unsustainable practices, (2) recognize each other as
human, and (3) it is a perceived human community that adheres to the concept that human
beings  in virtue of some unique characteristic  are  granted special  privileges in  relation to
everything else. The existence of this human tribe, or at least the current form of it, is flawed
and riddled with contradiction, and will be thoroughly addressed in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2: The Problem of the Human Prejudice
In the previous chapter I pointed out the ecological disasters that can be prevented or
reduced by a change in ethical sensibility. In this chapter I argue that the human prejudice is
also  philosophically  indefensible.  The desirable  ecological  change  needs  to  come  about
through  an  ideological  change  within  the  prevailing  human  culture:  To  change  how  we
conceive  of  this  worldwide  human  tribe (as  defined  in  chapter  1),  eliminate  the  human
prejudice,  and  replace  it  with  a  disposition  that  values  all  members  of  our  biological
community (outside personal tribes) as holding equal moral value regardless of species. This
means I am arguing on behalf of a biocentric view;  biocentrism  includes all views within
environmental ethics that expand the status of moral objects  from the human to all  living
things in nature. Taylor asserts 4 core biocentric beliefs that a rational and factually informed
moral agent should accept:
(a) The belief that the human are members of the Earth’s Community of Life in the same sense and on the
same terms in which other living things are members of that community. 
(b) The belief that the human species, along with all other species, are integral elements in a system of
interdependence such that the survival of each living thing, as well as its chances of faring well or poorly,
is determined not only by the physical conditions of its environment but also by its relations to other
living things. 
(c) The belief that all organisms are teleological centers of life in the sense that each is a unique individual
pursuing its own good in its own way,
(d) The belief that humans are not inherently superior to other living things. (Taylor 1986: 99-100).
 
In this thesis, biocentrism involves adopting the view that all living members of the ecological
community should be seen always as an end in itself and never merely as a means to one’s own
end: “to extend the recognition of “ends in themselves” beyond the sphere of man and make
the human good include the care for them” (Jonas 1984: 8). Therefore, the answer to why we
need this biocentrism is: first, the fact that it is a practically desirable moral sensibility that
provides a solution to the ecological crisis that impacts our relation to the biosphere. Second,
humans  are  inherently  morally-driven  creatures  and  if  we  find  the  human  tribe  to  be
philosophically indefensible then we need to find a rationally defensible community to apply
our morality to. Just because we find our human-biased mortality irrational does not mean we
can no longer apply our morality to the world.
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The only argument for an increased moral value or obligation to humans can be made
about oneself and the members of one’s personal tribes. The “personal tribe” depends partly
on who one subjectively values the life and freedom of, but I define it as a private community
of individuals that have a social and symbiotic relationship with each other – the beings that
make one’s life worth living. Generally humans are members of multiple overlapping personal
tribes;  these  tribes  can  exist  for  short  periods  of  time  or  be  life  long  depending  on  the
circumstances. Personal tribes, by their very nature, cannot include the whole of humanity due
to  the  fact  that  they  are  “personal”  and  are  characterized  by  the  social  and  biological
relationships an individual has with members of his or her community that is impossible to
have in relation to the entire human species. The importance of this personal tribe and its role
in how we morally justify certain actions will be readdressed in Chapter 3 when I address the
consequences of abandoning the human prejudice.
The underlying cause of our unsustainability, argued here, are certain aspects of our
current ethical sensibility – namely this human prejudice which I define as the internalization
of the idea that humans are special and because they are special they deserve to have special
rights.  A  complementary  definition,  provided  by  Bernard  Williams,  is  that  the  human
prejudice is something along the lines of the existence of human rights for us and granted by
us, “rights that are possessed by certain creatures because they are human beings, in virtue of
their being human” (Williams 2006: 138); the ‘rights’ Williams is talking of here refer to an
entitlement to be treated preferentially by other humans.
This  chapter  is  tasked  with  explaining  in  what  sense  our  culture  perceives  of
“humanity” and explains why we think there is such a tribe despite the fact that the human
tribe is both a philosophically inadequate notion and harmful to sustainability. Lastly it will
address opponents (Williams and Bookchin) who, despite  rejecting traditional  assumptions
about the importance of humans, still defend the preservation of “humanity” with a special
worth thus justifying the persistence of some sort of human prejudice. The human prejudice is
the central feature of the ethical sensibility of what in chapter 1 I called the prevailing human
culture.
Since I make this distinction between all humans and the prevailing human culture –
one  may  point  to  behavior  of  an  external  and  isolated  community  (i.e.  an  organic  self-
sustaining  community)  and  argue  it  is  exhibiting  anthropocentric  behavior  just  as  well.
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However, key differences in our situations make this point irrelevant; (1) organic communities
are  not  exponentially  depleting  their  ecosystems  of  resources  (e.g.  the  Bushmen  of  the
Kalahari desert of southern Africa seem to be working within the limits of their ecosystem
(New  World  Encyclopedia  Contributors  2016)).  (2)  Individuals  in  organic  communities
generally  do  not  fully  comprehend  the  global  effects  human  action  is  having  on  the
environment, while our society is fully aware of the environmental circumstances of Earth. (3)
The cultures of these organic communities are so vastly different from our own, it is really not
appropriate to apply to them the same concepts - ‘anthropocentrism’ and ‘biocentrism’. The
relations various organic communities have with nature can only properly be defined within
those cultures and we commit folly when we apply our own concepts to them. The large scale
sustainability  problems  are  unique  to  the  prevailing  human  culture  and  while  organic
communities may suffer from shortcomings the focus is on us and what we need to do in order
to make rational and beneficial change.
 The human prejudice developed into this overwhelming ecological problem for the
prevailing human culture as it combined with technology and population growth, and it is the
source  of  our  inability  to  change  our  behavior  today  because  of  the  increased  self-
consciousness that has evolved as a result of the skill in which we pass down our human-
centered values, attitudes, and “knowledge” from generation to generation. This chapter will
serve to show the philosophical inadequacies of this human prejudice.
2.1 – The Ambiguity of Defining Humanity and Moral Inclusion
Historically in ethics, when we defined “humanity” we would try to do so in a way that
would grant all members of the human species a special moral status without also including
any member of any other species. The discussion develops into a debate on what exactly is a
human (in  an  ethically  relevant  sense).  David  McNaughton  describes  the  difficulty  that
ethicists have had in creating a system of moral inclusion that includes all humans and only
humans:
If the standard inclusion in the sphere of moral concern is put too high then not only will most nonhumans
be excluded but so will some humans. […] If the standard is set so low that all humans are included then
many animals will gain entry and hence the special place of humans will again be threatened (brackets
added) (McNaughton 1991: 72).
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Elsewhere Douglas McLean recognizes, “the problem is that no morally relevant property is
unique to humans, and no uniquely human property seems to be morally relevant” (McLean
2010: 17). Basically, it has not been an easy task for ethicists to define the human in a unique
and  ethically  satisfactory  way,  and  as  knowledge  of  the  cognitive  abilities  of  animals
increases, the line between the human realm and nonhuman realm seems to be increasingly
blurred which gives biocentrics, like Paul Taylor, good ground in their denial of humans as
morally unique or superior. Biology, mutual human recognition, living amongst humans, and
the mental capacities of reason, self-reflection or language are all potential ways humans have
attempted to define the criteria for a special moral status reserved for humans and only for
humans. In “The Ethics of Respect for Nature”, Taylor expresses the fact that generally our
extension of increased moral concern to humans is not withheld merely on the grounds that a
particular human lacks the traits that we value as  the  human traits (reason, self-awareness,
language, etc.); such humans include infants, the severely retarded, and feral children (children
brought up away from other humans). We morally treat humans as humans not because of their
intelligence or our ability to communicate but simply because they are human. We are then put
in the situation where our special moral concern for humanity can only be supported by the
notion of sharing certain genetic traits which is philosophically problematic:
Why should the arrangement of genes of a certain type be a mark of superior value, especially when this
fact about an organism is taken by itself, unrelated to any other aspect of life? We might just as well refer
to any other genetic make as a ground of superior value. Clearly we are confronted here with a wholly
arbitrary claim that can only be explained as an irrational bias in our own favor (Taylor 1981: 216).
However, this human “us” that opponents in this chapter argue on behalf need not necessarily
be based on intrinsic biological or intellectual properties, but it could be based on more social
aspects of humanity such as our mutual recognition of each other as humans. This is to say
that  the combination of our cognition and mutual  recognition of each other  has  created a
perceived human “us” as an essential aspect of our human consciousness. 
While it is certainly true that humans belong to social groups that most animals do not
generally gain admission to (largely due to their comparative lack of cognitive ability), all
humans are not part of those social groups merely because they are human and any perceived
increased  human  connectedness  between  myself  and  a  John  Davis  from New Zealand  is
misplaced. Having increased interaction with humans outside personal tribes is an aspect of
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our survival structure but this doesn’t mean we should grant these external humans with a
special moral status. The common conception we have is that all of humanity is unified in
some way and humans tend to perceive an increased worth of other humans regardless of any
lack  of  relation,  as  if  they are  members  of  the  same group or  class  of  mutually  morally
included beings. Ironically and despite our feelings of mutual moral recognition, the society of
the  prevailing  human culture causes  the  unnecessary suffering  of  not  just  animals  but  of
humans around the globe as well. This, I argue, is a sign that the current conception of the
“human tribe”,  of humanity,  is paradoxical – this is because humans within the prevailing
human culture show little interest in altering their lifestyles for the well-being of humans on
the outside of their communities, nations, regions, religions, or wherever it is a person puts up
the moral boundary between “us” and “them”. If an individual is not willing to compromise
for the well-being of other humans then it is not appropriate to consider both people as part of
one and the same personal community. For example, a group such as “Americans” can replace
their smartphones every 6 months without any consideration for the Congolese people who are
displaced and suffer due to the mining of coltan (a rare earth metal) that is used to produce cell
phones.
Due to a sudden increase in demand and supply shortage, the price of coltan spiked in late 1999 and early
2000. This caused a “coltan rush”, which led to the violent expulsion of many farmers and their families
from  their  land  by  rebel  groups  and  ruthless  businessmen.  These  forced  displacements  particularly
affected properties were coltan could be found in abundance and in certain cases, slave labor was used in
the exploitation of these coltan-rich areas (Molango 2008: 5).
It should be noted, that many if not most westerners may be unaware of the exploitation of the
Congolese, however we all have access to this information and even if most westerners were
aware of this situation I doubt we would see a dramatic curb in behavior. I use this example
because while we may have grown quite accustomed to our shiny new phones, cell phones are
not necessary for us to thrive. Sacrificing lower prices and the constant replacement of old
phones with new ones in order to reduce the suffering of other humans is not asking for all that
much of an individual (although such a change would require dramatic alteration within the
industry).
It seems to me the vast majority of humans are perfectly fine with the taking advantage
of the suffering of other humans as long as it is done out of sight and out of mind. Indirectly
causing and ignoring the suffering of other humans is not characteristic of a unified mutually
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recognized ethical human society. If we are truly “one people” benefiting off the suffering of
these other humans would be emotionally intolerable. This is to say that Some opponents may
try to ground the human prejudice in a concept of a human community, but in order to have
something worth calling a human community, there need to be special ties of mutual care and
concern. The argument here is that there are no such ties, therefore there isn’t something worth
calling a human community on which the human prejudice could be grounded. This should
show that the belief in “humanity” as deserving increased moral concern in virtue of being
human is paradoxical, as we only seem to adhere to such an ideal when it is convenient for us.
This belief is able to preserve our uniqueness and superiority as a species yet we clearly do not
apply it  to our  actual  social  practices. This  is  not  to  say that  we are not  one community
because  we  sometimes  do  bad  things  to  one  another,  but  rather  we  cannot  be  a  single
community because the question of caring for a distant or unrelated human being seems to be
always an open one – true members of a unified community would at least be disposed to care
for one another. 
Many ethicists have argued that moral codes are applied to an entity in regards to their
“personhood status”. However, the concept of “personhood” is a separate concept from the
concept  of  “humanity”  and  the  human  tribe.  This  thesis  is  not  extending  the  status  of
personhood to all members of the ecological community, but instead will argue that the status
of personhood does not grant a being with superiority over other creatures. Taylor defines a
“person”  as,  “a  center  of  autonomous  choice  and  valuation.  Persons  are  beings  that  give
direction  to  their  lives  on  the  basis  of  their  own values”  (Taylor  1986:  33).  Personhood
involves a certain type of rational awareness that involves being a moral agent. Ethical codes
are  designed by “persons”  and persons  have  increased  moral  obligations  because  of  their
personhood.  It  may  also  be  true  that  due  to  their  unique  interests  we  have  unique
responsibilities towards creatures that are persons in order to treat them as ends-in-themselves,
however, having the status of personhood does not grant one a special worth and we have no
increased moral obligation towards persons because they are persons. 
To clarify the claims made in this section: I do not wish to argue that we should not in
some sense be morally concerned for distant and unconnected humans. The goal instead is to
redefine our moral framework, under more rational ecological grounds, to be concerned with
members of our global ecosystem not because they are human (which is irrational) but because
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we are mutual members of these interconnected ecosystems. Altering our behavior away from
the human prejudice would alleviate the suffering of both the people and the gorillas of the
Congo.3
The core idea of this thesis is that our moral relation to the ecosystem should be based
on  a  biological  interconnectedness  between  ourselves  and  the  rest  of  the  ecological
community. Taylor describes this interconnection as such: 
From the perspective of the biocentric outlook on nature we see human life as an integral part of the
natural order of the Earth’s biosphere. We thus conceive of the place of humans in the system of nature in
the same way we conceive of the place of other species. There is a common relationship to the Earth that
we share with wild animals and plants. Full awareness of this common relationship gives us a sense of
true community with them (Taylor 1986: 101).
The moral obligations we have to the ecosystem is to treat it as ends-in-themselves whenever
possible.  Specifically  these  obligations  depend  on  the  goals  and  interests  of  individual
organisms.
2.2 – Rejecting Arguments for less Dramatic Ideological Changes 
I  will  now  address  philosophers  who  defend  some  form  of  the  human  prejudice
regardless of  accepting the fact  that  humanity has  no intrinsic  superiority to non-humans.
Opposition  arguments  here  revolve  around  Bernard  Williams  who  broadly  rejects  the
historically  accepted  belief  in  “humanism”– defined as  the  belief  that  humans  possess  an
intrinsic  or  cosmic  significance  in  contrast  to  everything  else.  A second opponent  in  this
chapter is Bookchin, who strongly rejects the human right to dominate nature but still reserves
a special status for humans. As we will see they support some kind of ideological change – just
not to the degree of a complete dismissal of the human prejudice.
First thing to be addressed are arguments made by Williams in his article, “The Human
Prejudice”. His core argument is that a human prejudice – a disposition to take into special
account the mere fact that someone is a human being – is an ineliminable part of who we are,
of  our  humanity,  and this  is  a  significant  enough fact,  despite  humans  having  no special
importance from a cosmic point of view.
3“As some gorillas live on “coltan land”, increasing use of the numbers of mobile phones therefore seems to be 
destructive to gorilla habitats. Around 2000, a gorilla population was halved in one of DR Congo’s national park 
where coltan was being mined” (Boekhout van Solinge 2008: 11).
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Suppose we accept that there is no question of human beings and their activities being important or failing
to be so from a cosmic point of view. That does not mean that there is no point of view from which they
are important. There is certainly one point of view from which they are important, namely ours. […]
Whether a creature is a human being or not makes a large difference, a lot of the time, to the ways in
which we treat that creature or at least think that we should treat it (brackets added) (Williams 2006: 138).
Williams strongly asserts that in no way does this mutually recognized “us” get reduced to the
intrinsic superiority of humans:
Now there are some people who suppose that if in any way we privilege human beings in our ethical
thought, if we think that what happens to human beings is more important than what happens to other
creatures, if we think that human beings as such have a claim on our attention and care in all sorts of
situations in which other animals have less or no claim on us, we are implicitly reverting to a belief in the
absolute importance of human beings. They suppose that we are in effect saying, when we exercise these
distinctions between human beings and other creatures, that human beings are more important, period,
than those other creatures. That objection is simply a mistake. We do not have to be saying anything of
that sort at all. These actions and attitudes need express no more than the fact that human beings are more
important to us, a fact which is hardly surprising (Williams 2006: 139).
Williams argues on behalf of the idea that humanity is a “we” or “us” and that human beings
are  more  important  because  we,  as  humans,  cannot  help  but  viewing  ourselves  as  more
important.
In response to Williams, I  argue that,  first,  he seems to be adhering to the idea of
humanity as something unified and that  all  humans are supposedly a  part  of;  however  as
argued in 2.1, this is a flawed concept that is actually outright contradictory both in mentality
and behavior. Second, there is no reason to believe that valuing humans simply in virtue of
being human is inherent in being a human; it seems far more likely that such a sensibility is
the result  of social  conditioning. The question,  then,  is  how conceptually ingrained is  this
human-moral-entity?  We  can  easily  imagine  human  communities  that  draw  such  a  strict
boundary between ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ humans, that they react with total indifference to
out-group humans as humans – and not just for reasons of self-defense. There is no evidence
to support the claim that  all  humans possess a human prejudice. If the human prejudice has
been conditioned in us by society than there is no reason why we cannot be reconditioned to
abandon it, especially if doing so is ecologically beneficial and rational.
Williams makes several other arguments that in one way or another defend the human
prejudice.  The  first  is  largely  in  response  to  Peter  Singer  and  his  arguments  rejecting
speciesism. Singer is explicitly focused on the rights of sentient beings – which include all
creatures with the capacity to feel, perceive, or experience subjectively. This includes most
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animals, although certain animals are believed to lack sentience: “Insects are widely regarded
among neuroscientists as incapable of experiences like pain, since they lack the relevant neural
structures” (Arico, et al. 2011: 337). The properties Singer argues that are relevant for moral
inclusion  are  the  capacity  for  suffering  and  enjoyment,  entailing  that  additional  “human”
properties (e.g.  higher  cognition,  awareness,  or language) are not relevant as such. Singer
coins the term ‘speciesism’, which he defines as, “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the
interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of others species”
(Singer 1975: 6). Singer claims that speciesism is of the same nature as racism or sexism. In
Animal Liberation, Singer asks, “If possessing a higher degree of intelligence does not entitle
one  human  to  use  another  for  his  or  her  own end,  how can  it  entitle  humans  to  exploit
nonhumans for the same purpose?” (Singer 1975: 7). He continues by claiming:
Racists violate the principle for equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own
race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race [...] Similarly,
speciesists allow the interests of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other
species. The pattern is identical in each case (Singer 1975, 9).
In response to Singer, Williams argues that speciesism is of an entirely different nature
than  racism.  “If  there  is  a  human  prejudice,  it  is  structurally  different  from those  other
prejudices,  racism and sexism” (Williams 2006:  141).  Williams asserts  that  one important
difference is the fact that other animals cannot ask for or understand a justification for our
prejudice against them. A victim of sexism, for example, demands a rational explanation for
her mistreatment. Additionally in reference to animals there is only the question of ‘how we
should treat  them?’,  which Williams argues  is  entirely different  from racism where moral
recognition is expected of all parties involved – not just the oppressor (Williams 2006).
My objection  to  the  human  prejudice  is  unharmed  by these  perceived  differences
between the human prejudice and other prejudices – the lack of understanding and inability to
ask for justification by nonhumans is not relevant for our moral responsibilities towards the
ecological community. Even if the human prejudice were different from these other prejudices
as  Williams  claims,  my objection  remains  grounded upon the  indefensible  concept  of  the
human tribe. An ethical code rejects racism and sexism as they are rationally indefensible and
harmful to a healthy community and speciesism too is irrational, philosophically indefensible,
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and harmful to our ecological community. Thus, any perceived difference between speciesism
and racism is ethically trivial.
Another argument from Williams considers the example of a race of aliens coming to
Earth  with  morally  directed  intentions.  These  aliens  are  cognitively  superior  to  us  and
objectively benevolent in intentions, but intend to undermine current human norms and values:
They [the aliens] have had much more successful experience than we have in running peaceable societies,
and they have found that  they need to  run  them, and that  too much species-self-assertion or  indeed
cultural autonomy proves destabilizing and destructive. So, painlessly, they will rid us, certainly of our
prejudices, and, to the required extent, of some of our cultural and other peculiarities (brackets added)
(Williams 2006: 149).
Williams goes on to raise the stakes of this thought experiment even further:
The benevolent and fair-minded and farsighted aliens may know a great deal about us and our history, and
understand  that  our  prejudices  are  unreformable:  that  things  will  never  be  better  in  this  part  of  the
universe until we are removed. […]. This, it seems to me, is a place at which the project of trying to
transcend altogether the ways in which human beings understand themselves and make sense of their
practices could end up. And at this point there seems to be only one question left to ask: Which side are
you on? (brackets added) (Williams 2006: 152).
I can in large part respond to this within the arguments I have already made. It is important to
recognize, however, that the aliens are external to our ecological community and we need not
apply  moral  concern  to  them  unless  we  broaden  what  is  included  in  our  ‘ecological’
community – to the solar system, galaxy, etc. (Which we may want to do). Regardless if the
aliens pose a threat to the lives and freedoms and other core values (to be defined in the
following chapter) held by oneself and one’s personal tribe we can justifiably do anything that
is necessary to defend our lives and freedoms. If the aliens intend to force sustainability upon
us then an argument I make in the next chapter on ecofascism may be relevant. Williams
maintains that the question is ‘what side are you on?’ (humanity’s or the morally advanced
aliens’) – but when it comes to the threat of ecological collapse there are no sides – we either
alter our behavior and attitudes or we go under as a species along with a large portion of our
ecological neighbors.
A final point from Williams addresses is the importance of the nature of human values
for humans. This is a good transitioning discussion for my next opponent, Bookchin. Williams
asserts: “Human values are not just values that we have, but values that express our humanity,
and to study them is to study what we value inasmuch as we are what we are, that is to say,
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human beings”(Williams 2006: 138). What is being referred to in this discussion on “values”
is not merely the existence of values for humans but our cognitive ability to value in itself.
Bookchin argues that our very ability to value nature grants us a special status among life
forms: 
Insofar as human beings alone have an unprecedented capacity to create ethical systems that impart worth
to other life-forms, they clearly have a special  worth  in their own right. Insofar as they are capable of
being fully conscious of their behavior and its ecological impact (Bookchin 2005: 38-39).
Bookchin goes as far to claim that the nature and beauty of Earth essentially needs humans in
order for there to be something to appreciate and value this nature in the first place. This, he
argues, grants humans a special worth but he does not believe it follows that this special worth
gives us the right to dominate the natural world. 
In reply to Bookchin, first, it  is far from a settled matter on whether or not certain
animals hold the capacity to value aspects of the world, and work in animal cognition and
behavioral studies increasingly seems to show that at least some animals seem to have the
ability to appreciate some elements of the world (i.e. to value). Second, the true issue under
debate  here  is  the  claim that  being  capable  of  valuing  something  somehow is  something
worthy of increased value in itself. In contrast to the claim that these values give humans a
special worth I would argue our values gives us special “oughts” but it does not follow that we
deserve a special worth. Why, for example, do we not grant birds with superiority due to their
ability to fly? Basically the vast cognitive power of the human mind is of no importance to a
mushroom or an alligator. Since humans have this capacity to value, it seems to make more
sense to use it  to its  full  extent and to value the equal yet  vastly different means various
species have evolved for survival with the various characteristics of human cognition being
but one, especially if doing so is beneficial to our own survival as members of the Earth’s
biological community.
In  contrast  to  Bookchin,  I  see  no  reason  why  I  cannot  recognize  myself  as  an
individual, a biological member of the human species, endowed with the gift of incredible
cognition and the ability to appreciate beauty in the sublime and tranquil while still denying
that any of these things makes me an object of greater moral concern than any other creature
simply in virtue of me being a human. Not only this but I see no reason to create a moral
bubble  around  myself  and  other  entities  with  similar  identification  just  because  of  our
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similarities with one another. It may be true that I enter into relationships with these other like-
minded humans more easily than anything else but until I have a reason to value them more
they are but members of the community of the biosphere that I have no reason to put a special
moral status on.
As  already  mentioned  in  Chapter  1,  Bookchin  reduces  humanity’s  ecological
shortcomings to what he calls “hierarchical mentality”, and argues, “The [human] attempt to
dominate nature stems from the domination of human by human” (Bookchin 1980: 81). He
blames our ecological shortcomings on the development of a hierarchical class system within
human communities. Bookchin then continues by stating that, “The ecological crisis of our
time is testimony to the fact that the means of production developed by hierarchical society
and particularly by capitalism have become too powerful to exist as a means of domination”
(Bookchin 1980: 82). 
This  appeal  to  the problems of  “hierarchical  mentalities” is  partly in  line with my
thesis, however, in contrast I would claim that human domination of other humans was not
even possible on such a scale until after humans had begun to dominate nature; this is to say
that  before  one  tribe  of  humans  could  overpower  the  surrounding  tribes,  the  dominating
human tribe must have reduced natural resources to something of a commodity (a means-to-
an-end) to be stockpiled, giving them the necessary edge over their competition to not only
outcompete but to annihilate, subjugate, and forcibly integrate the competition.
In summary of this chapter, we can see that some of my opponents have accepted the
fact that there is no intrinsic superiority of the human species. Williams claims the existence of
the human prejudice comes from aspects of our condition as humans who mutually recognize
each other as such with the increased value coming from this recognition. Bookchin clearly
advocates  for  radical  ecological  change both  in  the  structure  of  society and in  our  moral
sensibilities. These views will, however, fail to initiate and maintain the necessary and lasting
mass sustainable changes that would result in a healthy biosphere. Not only this but views that
maintain the special  worth of humans are philosophically inadequate as  they perpetuate  a
contradictory human tribe united around our identification as humans. To persuade humans to
adopt  the  behavioral  changes  that  both  me  and Bookchin  advocate  for,  they need to  feel
emotionally connected, on some ground, to certain aspects of nature, namely the members of
our various ecological communities.
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Chapter 3: The Transition and the Consequences of Losing the Human Prejudice
This  chapter  is  concerned with the consequences  of  transitioning from our  current
paradigm into the biocentric outlook I argue for in this thesis. It will mainly be focused on the
predicted positive and negative ethical and political consequences of adopting this new moral
sensibility. A large portion will focus on rejecting consequences my opponents may fear are at
stake but are either unfounded or inconsequential.  The main questions of this chapter will
include: How such a change will occur? What are the political and ethical consequences? And
can we truly make this  shift  in  our  moral  sensibilities  without  losing  important  “human”
values (since many maintain that anthropocentrism is central to our core values)?
3.1 – Consequentialist concerns in the changing of our moral code
A major  opponent  to  this  chapter  will  come from particular  consequentialists  who
argue: The expected costs of abandoning the human prejudice by far outweigh the expected
benefits,  and  may in  fact  cancel  the  suggested  benefits.  These  costs,  the  consequentialist
opponent  might  argue,  include  human  values  and  the  comfort  of  current  lifestyles.
Consequentialism in general argues that the morally right act is that which produces the best
outcome among those that  one can produce,  and the morally wrong act  is  any act  which
produces less than the best outcome. “The most prominent example is consequentialism about
the moral rightness of acts, which holds that whether an act is morally right depends only on
the consequences of that act or of something related to that act, such as the motive behind the
act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2015).
Within consequentialism there is disagreement on whether or not we should count the
“transition  costs”  of  this  change  in  mindset  (in  this  case  the  transition  is  from  an
anthropocentric to a biocentric moral code). My argument will hold that the transaction cost
are of no real concern. To this, the rule-consequentialist, Brad Hooker, can provide support.
Hooker defines rule-consequentialism as follows:
 
Thus, full rule-consequentialism claims that an act is morally wrong if and only if it is forbidden by rules
justified by their consequences. It also claims that agents should do their moral decision-making in terms
of rules justified by their consequences. And it claims that the conditions under which moral sanctions
should be applied are determined by rules justified by their consequences. (Hooker 2015). 
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Hooker describes the objection in his book, Ideal Code, Real World:
So one objection to a code [in this case, a code that rejects the human prejudice] might be that it is so
complicated or calls for so much self-sacrifice that too much of society’s resources would have to be
devoted to getting it widely internalized. The internalization costs would be too high for the code to be
optimal (brackets added) (Hooker 2000: 78).
In response to this, Hooker argues:
We should not take into account the costs of getting a code [in this case, a code that rejects the human
prejudice] internalized by people who are already committed to some particular code. The cost of getting
a non-racist and non-sexist code adopted by people who have internalized racist and sexist rules,  for
example should not be counted (brackets added) (Hooker 2000: 80).
The  reason  for  this,  Hooker  continues,  is  because  these  racist  or  sexist  (or  in  my  case
speciesist)  rules  are  unjustifiable  and  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  “infect  rule-
consequentialist assessment”. Elsewhere Hooker will argue:
The way to [internalize a new moral code] is to formulate the theory in terms of acceptance by new
generations  of  humans.  So  we compare  the  respective  “teaching  costs”  of  alternative  codes,  on  the
assumption that these codes will be taught to children who have not already been educated to accept a
moral code (brackets added) (Hooker 2016).
This  last  point  is  of  particular  importance  to  this  thesis;  to  the  reader,  many  of  the
consequences may seem overwhelming and possibly even barbaric and disastrous, but I will
argue that is because of the current cultural influences of the prevailing culture that are to be
rejected and will not be shared by future generations. So the changes in moral sensibilities are
to be ingrained and taught to the younger generations – children whose minds have not yet
been conditioned and developed in a human-prejudiced society.
 Additionally, due to the very real and immediate threat of ecological collapse described
in Chapter 1, the costs of transitioning to this biocentric moral sensibility should be rather
insignificant  compared  to  the  consequences  of  keeping  the  current  course  with  minimal
environmentally directed change.
The possibility of the extinction of the human species, a possibility which starkly confronts us in the
contemporary world,  makes us  aware  of  another  respect  in  which we should not  consider  ourselves
privileged beings in relation to other species. This is the fact that the well-being of humans is dependent
upon the ecological soundness and health of many plant and animal communities (Taylor 1981: 208).
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One should also recognize that such a dramatic transition would probably be a gradual process
that  has  to  slowly  reverse  thousands  of  years  of  contrary  conditioning,  with  each  new
generation coming closer to the biocentric worldview (while also, hopefully, decreasing and
reversing  population  growth  through  a  rational  understanding  of  the  overpopulation
phenomenon).
3.2 – A Self-defeating Strategy? 
One potential problem of my argument for achieving sustainability is that: abandoning
the human prejudice might mean retreating to isolated communities, thus undermining the
possibility of cooperation, and thus eventually doing nothing effective to stop and reverse the
consequences of unsustainable behavior. If the notion of the human tribe, however faulty, is
lost,  it  seems unlikely that  isolated  humans  can  separately maintain  the  same sustainable
behavior and mental ideologies. If there is nothing to hold us together how do humans across
the globe maintain a similar ideology concerning ecology?
Perhaps the solution is to change the conception of the human tribe to something more
rational  and  less  self-contradictory  –  all  human  communities,  instead,  could  be  seen  as
entering  into  a  environmental  alliance  for  mutual  benefits.  The  idea  is  to  replace  the
contradictory conception of a  human tribe with that of a  human coalition (or  ecologically
conscious coalition), that exists for the sole purpose of saving our interconnected ecosystems
from ecological degradation and collapse. Consider this:
There existed a large island called  Azgard. On this island there lived many different tribes who lived
largely in isolation from one another – although occasionally they would violate each other's territory and
engage  in  minor  violent  skirmishes,  and  at  other  times  they  would  come  together  for  feasts  and
intermarriages because they all know that breeding indefinitely within one tribe is unwise to be avoided.
Eventually Azgard  was invaded by an external  force that  vastly overpowered  the beings of  a  single
‘Azargard-ian’ tribe. This force threatened to destroy everything on the island and the tribes realized that
they  must  band  together  in  order  to  save  themselves.  The  nature  of  this  union  did  not  involve  an
integration or merging of the tribes, and individuals within each tribe did not start to conceive of an
increased value for members of these other tribes. The only union that existed was that they universally
acknowledge the source of the problem and they needed the cooperation of all the tribes to stand a chance
of overcoming it, after all they are all cognitively aware members of the same threatened ecosystem. The
tribes collectively understood the interdependence of their ecosystems and the role each tribe needed to
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play in order to maintain it. In this sense they all had the same ideology concerning the events happening
on their island, habitat, and ecosystem.
The alliance of these tribes and the mutual conception they had of the external force is
similar to how I see the various cultures of humans on Earth and their need to cooperate to
solve the environmental crisis. We do not extend  increased  moral worth to the members of
these other cultures but we all collectively understand the threat and we need each other to
think and behave with a similar mindset if our island (Earth) is going to persist in a way that
allows us to thrive. We are connected not by our humanity but by the connection each of our
‘tribes’ has to the common biosphere, and by the reciprocal awareness of such connection. My
argument in this section is that it  is possible for us to preserve a mutual understanding of
responsibility toward the biosphere without the preservation of this human tribe.
3.3 – Ethical costs
The ethical consequences are most likely among the most significant worries for my
opponents. I am, after all, talking about a paradigm shifting change within the structure of
morality – since at the very dawn of Western thought, ethics has been indisputably human-
centered. “Ethical significance belonged to the direct dealing of man with man, including the
dealing with himself: all traditional ethics is anthropocentric” (Jonas 1984: 4).
The most significant fear that opponents may have is that such a change will in fact
cause the loss of many of our core values. I of course argue otherwise, but regardless I need to
determine what these core values include. Our core values are the aspects of our lives that are
needed in order to create the conditions under which there is a possibility of living a happy
and fulfilled life. We cannot of course pretend to have a comprehensive list of all the essential
values we self-conscious beings hold near and dear, however, on the shortlist of core ‘human’
values I include: (i) experiencing and maintaining close and meaningful relationships with
other  beings; the mutual support an individual receives and gives  to the communities one
identifies with; (ii) The experience and expression of one’s freedom. The freedom that exists
as a core value for self-conscious beings who are aware of the concept of freedom is the
internal  feeling  of  being  in  control  of  our  lives  and  where  they are  going.  Our  freedom
involves  having the ability to  participate  in  the formulation  of  our  futures.  To help grasp
freedom as a core value I will appeal to the capabilities approach, described here:
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The capability approach is a theoretical framework that entails two core normative claims: first, the claim
that the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral  importance,  and second,  that  freedom to
achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people's capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to
do and be what they have reason to value (Robeyns 2016).
Essentially the freedom that is reduced to a core value for humans is the freedom of choice –
which in and of itself, is of direct importance to one’s quality of life. However it should be
added that one’s desire to preserve freedom of choice is not only directed at the self but also
includes  the  members  of  one’s  personal  tribe.  (iii)  The  final  core  value  I  assert  is  the
preservation of art and innovation, as our condition as freedom seeking self-conscious beings
pushes us to express ourselves and relate life to others in creative and meaningful ways (i.e.
through art, music, innovation, etc.). This includes the human drive to create, innovate, and
express themselves, not just through traditional art but through the creation of ‘technology’ as
well.  Our  values  go  beyond  merely  meeting  the  demands  of  survival,  we  have  to  find
meaningful reasons for us to live lives that we internally consider worth living.
The objection, then, is the claim that without a human prejudice operating within our
moral sensibilities, we would undermine all or some of the values listed above. If this is the
case, then my thesis is in danger of collapse as what I am asking would destroy our purpose
for living.
However, it is my intent to show that the loss of the human prejudice does not involve
the loss of our core values.  I maintain that we can preserve our meaningful relationships,
express  our  freedoms,  and  appreciate  our  unique  accomplishments  in  art  and  technology
without the persistence of an anthropocentric outlook. We can find support in this statement
from Cora Diamond:
Moral concern is something we have not as rational beings nor as animals with certain capacities but as
members of communities within which this or that language or moral deliberation has taken shape, and
within which there are various uses of ‘we’, ‘us’ (contrasting with ‘them’), expressive of solidarity with
fellow members of a community (Diamond 2008: 39). 
This is to say that our valuing of others comes from the moral relations we have with members
of our community and not because they are human but because there exists  an emotional
solidarity. The core values are not in danger, because they can be still supported from within
human communities (in the plural), where the "us" is not "us as human beings" but more like
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the "us" of the personal  tribes defined in Chapter  2.  However,  I  should clarify that  these
personal communities while usually and necessarily are human composed they do not have to
be – humans can enter into intimate personal tribes with nonhumans (e.g. dog companions).
Bookchin makes an argument that is appropriate to address here concerning the human
perceived “otherness” of humans from nonhumans. He argues that our whole self-conscious
existence  is  dependent  on  our  understanding  of  humans  as  something  “other”  from
nonhumans. 
Human beings at some point has to at least begin to see first nature generally as an “other” if their self-
identity and self-consciousness as human beings were to emerge. […]  In order for human beings to
differentiate themselves in natural evolution, there must be duality, such as dualities between self and
other and between human and nonhuman (brackets added) (Bookchin 2005: 48).
In reply to Bookchin, I agree that we do need to have concepts of the self and the other
for our self-consciousness to exist as it does, and it may also be true that without the sense of
'otherness' we wouldn't be able to maintain our core values. However, it does not follow that
preserving this sense of “otherness” requires making a moral distinction between man and
animal,  nor does it follow that recognizing oneself  as an “other” is the same as placing a
special worth on oneself.
 In short, arguments that assert that our core values depend on maintaining the human
prejudice are philosophically inadequate. So while some claim that preserving human values
requires the valuing of humans as something superior  in some regard to non-humans,  my
argument suggests instead that human values can be preserved while rejecting the perceived
superior value of humans. While historically it may be true that the expression of our core
values went along with unsustainable behavior, I have argued here that such values can be
promoted also within a non-human-prejudiced, and thus sustainable, way of life.
While talking about ethical costs, it seems appropriate to ask: how will our new moral
sensibilities  transfer  over  into  our  day  to  day  interactions  with  various  humans  and
nonhumans?  It  is  at  this  point  that  I  will  separate  myself  most  starkly  from the  cosmic
egalitarian, the biocentrism of Paul Taylor, and the utilitarianism of Peter Singer. Readers may
ask:  ‘Is  killing  a  mosquito  that  has  landed  on  oneself  just  as  morally  reprehensible  as
murdering a human stranger?’ The answer is complex: yes, the mosquito in principle is to be
valued just as much as a unrelated human. Some biocentrics (who depend on the concept of
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intrinsic value to all living creatures) may advocate for the avoidance of such an act of killing
a mosquito. Instead I argue that we need to recognize the cruel reality of the world and the fact
life kills other life that is in its way or violates its space. I feel justified killing an insect that is
using me as prey, but I also recognize the severity of my decision to kill that insect. Now while
John Davis from New Zealand is just as valuable to me as the mosquito, there is no moral
justification for my killing of him until he attacks me with a syringe in an attempt to steal my
blood.
Since the inherent value of life argued for by my biocentric cohorts is not present in
my argument, my theory can justify the murder of a mosquito that has bitten me or a wasp that
has stung my child. It also allows me to withhold moral concern from lifeforms that are not
connected  to  our  ecosystems  in  the  appropriate  manner  –  such  as  viruses  which  are  not
members of our ecological community in the way plants, animals, and fungi are and cannot
truly  be  considered  part  of  the  “unified  web  of  interconnected  organisms”.  To  truly  be
included as part of this interconnected web an entity must be affected by the ecosystem and its
various members and also must have an effect on the ecosystem. Humans for example are both
dependent on and can harm or complement nature depending on our actions.
Furthermore, the existence of the personal tribe in my framework, allows me to justify
preferential treatment to certain beings due to their relation to me while Singer and Taylor
would advocate for a more egalitarian framework. This ties back to preserving our values and
the  above  quote  from  Diamond,  in  that  my  biocentrism  does  not  require  equal  moral
responsibility for all  life  or  all  members  of  the ecological  community – moral  concern is
justifiably directed more intensely at the entities one subjectively and rationally values more
which, I believe, should be taken as an obvious fact of life. 
Another  question  may  be  whether  vegetarianism  is  a  consequence  of  the  new
biocentric  moral  sensibility.  More  broadly the  question  here  is  whether  there  is  increased
moral  concern  for  certain  lifeforms  (such  as  sentient  beings).  Singer’s  animal  ethics  will
certainly be in support of vegetarianism and defend “sentientism”. Singer argues that plants do
not have ‘interests’ and do not experience ‘pain’ or ‘pleasure’ and thus should not be objects of
moral concern (Singer 1975).
I do not, however, believe vegetarianism is required. Realistically, meat consumption
will necessarily be dramatically reduced as cultivating meat has a much larger impact on the
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ecosystem and the factory-farm will certainly be categorically rejected. A complete switch to
vegetarianism in self-sustaining communities, however, is not necessary. We can speculate that
in a sustainable society the majority of food come from locally based sources and most local
communities can only grow certain types of plants with a limited range of nutritional value.
Scandinavians are probably not going to have a seemingly unlimited supply of fresh pineapple
in  January.  To  clarify,  keeping  commercial  relations  between  continents  would  still  be
theoretically possible, but realistically the amount of energy and resources needed to supply
adequate food across continents is impractical; also, areas that grow high-demand foods, like
pineapple, probably could no longer justify the sacrificing of so much of their own habitat in
order  to  supply  food  to  external  communities.  So  it's  reasonable  to  assume  that  trans-
continental food exchange will decrease significantly in a sustainable global economy. Proper
nutrition, I would argue, is a necessary condition for sustaining the core values listed above. If
one  lives  a  sustainable  lifestyle  with  a  balanced  nutrition  –  say  in  the  North  Georgia
Appalachian  Mountains  –  deer  is  on  the  menu.  Deer  are  abundant  in  north  Georgia  and
provide nutrients that local plants do not.
Unlike Singer’s ethical theory, this thesis has no concern with the so-called ‘sentience’
of a species – plants play just as important a role in the balance of ecosystems and in my
theory there really is no moral difference in the value of a plant and an animal (although what
is morally required of us towards different lifeforms is obviously subject to variation). Also
contrary to Singer’s claim, I would argue plants and fungi do have interests, perhaps not in a
relatable human sense, but they do exist to survive and respond positively and negatively to
environmental  stimuli  or  as  Taylor  says,  “are  teleological  (goal-oriented)  centers  of  life”
(Taylor  1986: 45).  I  should also clarify that the preservation of biodiversity (as argued in
chapter 1) is of paramount concern – so the life of an endangered gorilla is of more concern
than a common pine tree... or human for that matter.
Some opponents of biocentrism (e.g. Bookchin) base their opposition on a perceived
threat  biocentrism  poses  to  the  valuing  of  our  human  achievements.  Bookchin  refers  to
biocentric views as “mystic ecology” and represent views that despise all  the creations of
humanity (e.g. technology)  as transgressions against the “Earth Goddess”:
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The insidious devaluation of human achievements promoted by mystical ecologies is accompanied by a
hatred of all that is specifically human: a hatred of reason, science, art, and technological innovation in
almost all its forms. (Bookchin 2005: 39).
However, biocentrics do not  have  to claim anything of the sort. While there is a lot
ingrained  in  this  human  culture  to  despise,  our  innovation  and  use  of  technology  and
appreciation for the arts  are not necessarily among them. There is no reason why humans
cannot continue in their appreciation of art and academia as well as developing technologically
while also maintaining a biocentric ideology that does not grant special privileges to humans
because they are part of a special class that other lifeforms are excluded from.
As I  have  argued throughout  this  thesis,  humans  need to  feel  just  as  much moral
obligation  towards  other  members  of  the  ecological  community  as  they  do  toward  other
humans – to recognize the “natural freedoms” of living things as part of one’s own fulfillment
as a morally driven consciousness. The internalization of these ecological sensibilities will
result  in positive social change within our communities and may very well help us in the
flourishing of the core values I described above.
3.4 – Political Costs
In addition to the ethical costs of the abandoning the human prejudice, there might also
be fears of dramatic political costs. Any reformation of society to be sustainable will require
serious  (perhaps  revolutionary)  change  in  our  political  structure.  Many  of  these  political
changes, such as the collapse of hierarchical society, I will argue are actually beneficial. Others,
such as the risk of ecofascism is avoided by the voluntary adoption of a new moral sensibility.
A consequence some may fear in the face of sustainable advocacy is the perceived
threat of ecofascism. Ecofascism is defined by environmental historian, Michael Zimmerman,
as “a totalitarian government that requires individuals to sacrifice their interests to the well-
being and glory of the 'land', understood as the splendid web of life, or the organic whole of
nature, including peoples and their states" (Zimmerman 531: 2008). However, my theory is
designed specifically to avoid such undesirable political consequences. Despite the ecological
need for this  new mentality,  the need for sustainability alone is  not enough to justify our
culture’s abandonment of the human prejudice. This goes back to “saving the world” not just
from us but for us. As already argued, there would be no point in saving this world if humans
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are forced to sacrifice their essential values. If the goal was merely to save the world from the
behavior of humans then we need only fling ourselves of a cliff or to impose some sort of ban
on reproduction. The whole point of sustainability is to save a world worth living in. If human
culture was to attain a sustainable state by implementing an ecofascist regime, humans would
lose  their  freedom  to  act  and  make  decisions,  and  any  sort  of  existential  fulfilment  or
Aristotelian flourishing would be destroyed.
Fears of ecofascism aside, internalizing this new biocentric moral code will have some
rather significant consequences to the political structure of our society. As already hinted at by
both Bookchin and myself earlier in the thesis, many elements of hierarchical society will no
longer  be  a  viable  means  of  governing  as  the  current  hierarchical  structure  is  a  major
contributor to our ecological degradation. In abandoning the hierarchical structure to society
there is one change that I believe is of particular importance which can be referred to as the
“lock and stock”  tendency developed along with hierarchical  mentality which  is  probably
associated with the evolution of communal property into private and state property. What is
being referred to here is the practice of keeping food resources under ‘lock and key’ meaning
the  government  or  leadership  of  the  society  keeps  food  resources  locked  away from the
community. So ‘food’ is treated as a commodity – a means to gain wealth to be exchanged for
labor instead of a basic ‘right’ for members of the community in the way access to clean water
and air  is.  This is  not to reject the practice of exchanging labor for food – what must be
abandoned is the use of food as a means to force lower classes of the community to work and
produce excessively for those who hold the key to the food supply. This is why in modern
society lower classes continue to have to work excessive hours to make ends meat despite the
technological advancements of automation of much of the work that was once done by hand.
It might be helpful to show how this gradual transformation may take place through
actual real world examples. Today not all human communities can be easily categorized as
part of the prevailing human culture or as an isolated community. There are some tribes that
interact  regularly with  the  prevailing  human  culture  and  are  partly  shaped  by it  but  still
maintain ethical sensibilities that are partial towards the views I present in this thesis. Tribes in
such a gray area are good examples of humans moving towards the desired outlook. One
example is the Whanganui tribe (a specific tribe within the cultural group known as the Māori
People) of New Zealand who view certain parts of nature as part of their own community. This
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tribe recently won a court case granting the Whanganui river the legal status of a living entity.
The tribe identifies the river as an ancestor and an indivisible whole which suggests a very
non-anthropocentric mentality. However the tribe obviously worked within the parameters of
the prevailing human culture in order for their river to get legal “person status” (Roy 2017).
Encouraging this sort of internalization and recognition is an example of how our society can
begin to gradually change itself into sustainable biocentric communities. This court case is the
first  of  its  kind,  but  we  should  try  to  normalize  such  events  along  with  the  moral
internalizations present in Māori culture and gradually improve upon them.
As for wider political changes, it  is hard to pinpoint how exactly governments and
nations will change, but it's safe to assume that “the nation” in its current form will change
dramatically,  especially in a place like the United States where there will no longer be an
increased connection between members merely because they are humans living within the
same imaginary borders thus destroying nationalism. In addition to these political costs there
will be numerous economic, health, and infrastructure costs. These costs could include costs to
medicine, warfare, global economy, technology, police, as well as many others but since they
largely have no bearing on the philosophical argument and can only be speculated on at this
point so I will leave them as further questions to be addressed outside this thesis.
3.5 – The Remaining Moral Questions and the Advancement of Ethical Theories
I have argued that biocentrism, the defense of human core values, and the importance
of personal tribes are all part of the new ethical outlook, but this general framework still leaves
many moral  questions open. There is  still  the problem of developing new ethical theories
around this new outlook. I would argue that individuals need to determine what actions are
necessary to preserve the lives and freedoms of the personal tribe: what must one kill? What
must  one cause suffering to? The question that remains is – what  is  necessary? For me this
depends on the particular circumstance and the particular individuals involved in the moments
when action is required and moral questions are asked. However, the war between different
ethical  theories  (e.g.  Kantian,  Aristotelian,  etc.)  will  wage  on,  only  with  a  new  moral
sensibility that includes the entire ecological community. 
The human prejudice, then, and any concept of humans deserving special rights based
on their biology, communicative ability, or some other ability must be abandoned and replaced
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by an ideology of ecological equity (whether a person is motivated by reason and science or
spirit  and mysticism).  The philosophies  of  Williams,  Bookchin  and Singer  could serve as
important stepping stones in the gradual adoption of biocentrism. Adopting an attitude towards
all other life as an end-in-itself – to recognize the natural freedom of the other members of the
biological community – is the needed force for autonomously motivating a sustainable change
in behavior. While there may be no intrinsic value of life, my life and the lives of my tribe
members matter to me, and these lives are dependent on the ecological community as a whole
which  I  am also  a  member  of,  and  must  therefore  treat  as  a  moral  object.  It  should  be
mentioned though that increased ‘rights’ of personal tribes only entails the increased right and
obligation to protect their lives and essential freedoms, which should not interfere with the
ability to act sustainably. We could refer to this view as an Existential Biocentrism – as it is an
ethical theory that argues for the equal moral inclusion of all living members of the ecological
community despite acknowledging that their may every well be no significant value to life in
contrast  to  non  living  matter.  Moral  distinctions  based  on  membership  to  humanity  are
irrational,  not  because  of  an  objective  equal  worth  of  life,  but  because  the  ecological
community exists and a global human community does not. 
Our condition as ‘self-conscious’ beings means that our motivations and adaptations
come through ideological changes in mindset – this is how we adapt as a community; and this
is  how,  I  believe,  we  may find  a  way to  continue  to  survive  and  flourish  alongside  our
ecological neighbors even in the face of the environmental challenges we face today due to the
unregulated actions of generations of humans within the prevailing human culture.
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Conclusion
The goal of this thesis was to argue first that there exists serious and urgent ecological
problems  caused  by  human  behavior,  and  further,  argue  the  best  means  of  achieving
sustainability and solving this ecological crisis is through the internalization of a biocentric
moral code that values all members of the ecological community as ends-in-themselves. The
importance of doing so is to achieve and maintain sustainability while preserving our core
values  which  are  reduced  to  freedom,  meaningful  relationships,  and  the  expression  of
ourselves  through  art  and  innovation.  The  analysis  of  the  human  prejudice  shows  it  is
philosophically inadequate. 
In chapter 1, I describe the circumstances of the ecological crisis and show it is indeed
caused by the actions of the prevailing human culture. I then reject arguments that assert the
ecological problems can be solved within human-centered ethics that look for solutions within
economic changes or cost-benefit analysis as well as all views that maintain the humanistic
biblical  conception  of  land.  I  conclude  the  chapter  by  claiming  a  change  in  our  moral
sensibilities towards nature must take place. 
Chapter 2 explains the nature of the ambiguous moral concept of the human. The main
objective of the chapter is to show that the human prejudice is philosophically unsupportable
and furthermore must be eliminated from our moral code if we wish to achieve a desirable
state of sustainability. The opponents in this chapter recognize the shortcomings of traditional
anthropocentric  thought  but  still  maintain  a  human  prejudice  that  grants  special  worth  to
human entities is defensible or necessary. 
Chapter 3 addresses the perceived costs of adopting this new moral code. I first argue
that we need not include the transition costs of doing so due to the fact that they are to be
gradual and largely inconsequential compared to the threat of ecological collapse. I formulate
how  we  may  maintain  a  global  ethical  understanding  of  ecological  concern  without  the
preservation  of  a  global  human  tribe.  I  then  address  concerns  of  the  ethical  costs  of
internalizing a biocentric moral code; here I address perhaps the main concern of the chapter
and maintain that  it  is  possible  to  preserve our core values without  being possessed by a
human prejudice. I also address political costs of my theory and dismiss fears of ecofascism,
while  also  recognizing  the  necessary  collapse  of  hierarchical  society  and  the  modes  of
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production that developed alongside it. Lastly I recognize that ethical debates will carry on
and difficult moral questions will continue to plague our thoughts.
One remaining question is how do we best encourage the internalization of this new
moral code? Should it  be through hard reason, evolution and scientific  understanding? Or
should it come from a more sentimental place and appeal to an emotional connection to the
interconnectedness of nature as Taylor suggests? It may be true that members of our culture
are irrational in how they interpret evidence, which certainly supports many currently held
irrational beliefs held by flat-earth theorists, dinosaur deniers, and Adam and Eve creationists
– which are overturned by the most rudimentary logical arguments and scientific evidence.
Adopting a mindset that sees all lifeforms in our biological community as ends and
themselves and to have their natural freedoms flourish should initiate the necessary behavioral
changes  that  could  very  well  save  our  quickly  declining  habitat  which  has  become  the
biosphere of Earth. A whole new world will be opened to the unborn generations, one that will
hopefully grant them the happiness and fulfillment that is so painfully lacking for so many in
today's materialistic and anthropocentric society. Our new sustainable society should redefine
the concept of wealth within communal well-being, and appreciation for nature will be an
inherent aspect of our lifestyles. We are moral and rational beings by our vary nature and when
we apply our morality to the world in a way that is both rational and practical we should
recognize  our  position  as  an  equal  member  of  the  ecological  community  known  as  the
biosphere of Earth.
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Abstract
Chapter I will, using scientific research, explain the nature of the environmental crisis and
show that it is indeed caused by what I refer to as the prevailing human culture. Key concepts
used in this thesis will be defined (such as ecology and prevailing human culture). I will reject
views that do not think the current human moral sensibility is the problem concerning the
environment.  Various  opposition  arguments  will  defend  the  current  conservative  moral
boundary  between  humans  and  nature,  including  M.  Sagoff’s  artificialist  proposal.  Also,
solutions  in  terms  of  a  human-centered  cost-benefit  analysis  along with  the  “Abrahamic”
conception of human dominance over nature will be rejected.
Chapter II will focus on the philosophical inadequacies of the human prejudice in all its forms.
I will argue mainly against opponents who reject ‘humanism’ but wish to preserve some sort
of  human moral  privilege  or  status.  The chapter  will  address  the  ambiguity of  the  moral
inclusion of being  “human” to which D. McNaughton and P. Taylor provide talking points. I
will  reject  B.  Williams's  concept  of the human “us” thus arguing it  is  an irrational  belief
adopted by the  prevailing human culture. Another opponent for this chapter is M. Bookchin
who places a special status on humans based on  the human capacity to value. I will also
criticize Bookchin’s claims that “mystical” biocentric notions belittle and demonize human
achievements.
Chapter III will address the ethical and political consequences of internalizing a biocentric
moral code and argue against those who believe the consequences are too steep. While they
may seem costly to us that is only because we still have the mindset of the prevailing human
culture  which  will  not  exist  in  future  generations.  Opponents  in  the  chapter  include
consequentialists who argue there's more ‘good’ in maintaining the human prejudice, as well
as all those who defend anthropocentric society. I will maintain that the core values defined in
this thesis can be preserved and progressed without anthropocentrism.
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